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Abstract
Many economic decisions can be described as an option exercise or optimal stopping
problem under uncertainty. Motivated by experimental evidence such as the Ells-
berg Paradox, we follow Knight (1921) and distinguish risk from uncertainty. To
aﬀord this distinction, we adopt the multiple-priors utility model. We show that
the impact of ambiguity on the option exercise decision depends on the relative
degrees of ambiguity about continuation payoﬀs and termination payoﬀs. Conse-
quently, ambiguity may accelerate or delay option exercise. We apply our results
to ﬁrm investment and exit problems, and show that the myopic NPV rule can be
optimal for an agent having an extremely high degree of ambiguity aversion.
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Many economic decisions can be described as binary choices. Examples are abundant.
An investor may decide whether and when to invest in a project. A ﬁrm may decide
whether and when to enter or exit an industry. It may also decide whether and when to
default on debt. A worker may decide whether and when to accept a job oﬀer. All these
decisions share three characteristics. First, the decision is irreversible to some extent.
Second, there is uncertainty about future rewards. Third, agents have some ﬂexibility
in choosing the timing of decisions. These three characteristics imply that waiting has
positive value. Importantly, all the preceding problems can be viewed as a problem where
agents decide when to exercise an “option” analogous to a ﬁnancial call option – it has
the right but not the obligation to buy an asset at some future time of its choosing.
This real-options approach has been widely applied in economics and ﬁnance (see Dixit
and Pindyck (1994)). The aim of the present paper is to analyze an option exercise
problem where there is a distinction between risk and uncertainty in the sense attributed
to Knight (1921), and where agents’ attitudes toward uncertainty play a nontrivial role.
As argued by Dixit (1992), the standard real-options approach to investment under
uncertainty can be summarized as “a theory of optimal inertia”. “It says that ﬁrms
that refuse to invest even when the currently available rates of return are far in excess
of the cost of capital may be optimally waiting to be surer that this state of aﬀairs is
not transitory. Likewise, farmers who carry large losses may be rationally keeping their
operation alive on the chance that the future may be brighter” (Dixit (1992, p.109)).
However, the standard real-options approach rules out the situation where agents are
unsure about the likelihoods of states of the world. It typically adopts strong assumptions
about agents’ beliefs. For example, according to the rational expectations hypothesis,
agents know the objective probability law of the state process and their beliefs are identi-
cal to this probability law. Alternatively, according to the Bayesian approach, an agent’s
beliefs are represented by a subjective probability measure or Bayesian prior. There is
no meaningful distinction between risk, where probabilities are available to guide choice,
and uncertainty, where information is too imprecise to be summarized adequately by
probabilities. By contrast, Knight (1921) emphasizes this distinction and argues that
1uncertainty is more common in decision-making. Henceforth, we refer to such uncer-
tainty as Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity. For experimental evidence, the Ellsberg
Paradox suggests that people prefer to act on known rather than unknown or ambigu-
ous probabilities.1 Ellsberg-type behavior contradicts the Bayesian paradigm, i.e., the
existence of any prior underlying choices.
To incorporate Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity, we adopt the recursive multiple-
priors utility model developed by Epstein and Wang (1994). In this model, the agent’s
beliefs are represented by a collection of sets of one-step-ahead conditional probabilities.
These sets of one-step-ahead conditionals capture both the degree of ambiguity and
ambiguity aversion.2 The axiomatic foundation for the recursive multiple-priors utility
model is laid out by Epstein and Schneider (2003). The static multiple-priors utility
model is ﬁrst proposed and axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
We describe an ambiguity averse agent’s option exercise decision as an optimal stop-
ping problem. We then characterize the optimal stopping rules. The standard real options
approach emphasizes the importance of risk in determining option value and timing of
option exercise. An important implication is that an increase in risk in the sense of mean
preserving spread raises option value and delays option exercise. Recognizing the diﬀer-
ence between risk and ambiguity, we conduct comparative statics analysis with respect
to the set of one-step-ahead conditionals.
In our model, the agent is ambiguous about a state process which inﬂuences the
continuation and termination payoﬀs. Importantly, we distinguish between two cases
according to whether or not the agent is still ambiguous about the termination payoﬀ
after he exercises the option. This distinction is critical since it may generate opposite
comparative statics results. We show that for both cases, ambiguity lowers the option
value. Moreover, if there is no uncertainty after option exercise, a more ambiguity averse
agent will exercise the option earlier. However, if he is also ambiguous about termination
payoﬀs after option exercise, he may exercise the option later. This is because ambiguity
1See Ellsberg (1961). One version of the story is as follows. A decision maker is a oﬀerred a bet on
drawing a red ball from two urns. The ﬁrst urn contains exactly 50 red and 50 black balls. The second
urn has 100 balls, either red or black, however the exact number of red or black balls is unknown. Vast
majority agents choose from the ﬁrst urn rather than the second.
2For a formal deﬁnition of ambiguity aversion, see Epstein (1999), Epstein and Zhang (2001), and
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002).
2lowers the termination payoﬀ and this eﬀect may dominate the decrease in the option
value.
We provide two applications – real investment and ﬁrm exit – to illustrate our re-
sults. The real investment decision is an example where an agent decides whether or
not to exercise an option to pursue upside potential gains. Entry and job search are
similar problems. Under a speciﬁcation of the set of priors, we show explicitly that if
the investment project generates a stream of future uncertain proﬁts and if the agent
is ambiguous about these proﬁts, then a more ambiguity averse agent invests relatively
later. The exit problem represents an example where an agent decides whether or not
to exercise an option to avoid downside potential losses. Other examples include default
and liquidation decisions. We show that the exit timing depends crucially on whether
the ﬁrm is ambiguous about the outside value. This ambiguity may dominate the ef-
fect of ambiguity about the proﬁt opportunities if stay in business. Consequently, an
ambiguity averse ﬁrm may be hesitant to exit, even though it has lower option value.
For both investment and exit problems, we solve some examples explicitly under some
speciﬁcation of the set of priors. We show that the myopic net present value (NPV) rule
can be optimal for an agent having an extremely high degree of ambiguity aversion.
This paper adds to the literature on applications of decision theory to macroeco-
nomics and ﬁnance surveyed recently by Backus, Routledge and Zin (2004). The idea
of ambiguity aversion and the multiple-priors utility model have been applied to asset
pricing and portfolio choice problems in a number of papers.3 A diﬀerent approach based
on robust control theory is proposed by Hansen and Sargent and their coauthors.4 They
emphasize “model uncertainty” which is also motivated in part by the Ellsberg Paradox.
We refer readers to Epstein and Schneider (2003) for further discussion on these two
approaches.
Our paper is related to Nishimura and Ozaki (2003, 2004). Nishimura and Ozaki
(2004) apply the Choquet expected utility model proposed by Schmeidler (1989) to study
a job search problem.5 They show that ambiguity reduces the reservation wage and speeds
3See Epstein and Wang (1994, 1995), Chen and Epstein (2002), Epstein and Miao (2003), Kogan and
Wang (2002), Epstein and Schneider (2004a,b), and Routledge and Zin (2003).
4See, for example, Anderson, Hansen and Sargent (2003) and Hansen and Sargent (2000).
5The Choquet expected utility model is another well known model that also addresses ambiguity. It
3up job acceptance. Nishimura and Ozaki (2003) apply the continuous time multiple-priors
utility model developed by Chen and Epstein (2002) to study an irreversible investment
problem. They show that ambiguity delays investment. Our paper reconciles these
conﬂicting results in a general uniﬁed framework of the optimal stopping problem. An
added payoﬀ is that our framework can address a variety of option exercise problems
such as exit.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
results. Section 3 presents applications to ﬁrm investment and exit problems. Section 4
concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
In this section, we ﬁrst introduce the multiple-priors utility model in Section 2.1. We
then provide a three-period investment example in Section 2.2 to illustrate the impact
of ambiguity on the option exercise decision. Next, we present a baseline setup of the
optimal stopping problem in Section 2.3. After that, we present characterization and
comparative statics results in Section 2.4. We ﬁnally consider extensions in Section 2.5.
2.1 Multiple-Priors Utility
Before presenting the model, we ﬁrst provide some background about multiple-priors
utility. The static multiple-priors utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) can
be described informally as follows. Suppose uncertainty is represented by a measurable
space (S,F). The decision-maker ranks uncertain prospects or acts, maps from S into
an outcome set X. Then the multiple-priors utility U (f) of any act f has the functional
form:




where u : X → R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index and ∆ is a subjective set
of probability measures on (S,F). Intuitively, the multiplicity of priors models ambiguity
has been applied to study wage contracts by Mukerji and Tallon (2004). Also see the references therein
for other applications.
4about likelihoods of events and the minimum delivers aversion to such ambiguity. The
standard expected utility model is obtained when the set of priors ∆ is a singleton.
The Gilboa and Schmeidler model is generalized to a dynamic setting in discrete time
by Epstein and Wang (1994). Their model can be described brieﬂy as follows. The time
t conditional utility from a consumption process c = (ct)t≥0 is deﬁned by the Bellman
equation




t [Vt+1 (c)], (1)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, E
q
t is the conditional expectation operator with
respect to measure q, and Pt is a set of one-step-ahead conditional probabilities, given
information available at date t. An important feature of this utility is that it satis-
ﬁes dynamic consistency because it is deﬁned recursively in (1). Recently, Epstein and
Schneider (2003) provide an axiomatic foundation for this model. They also develop a
reformulation of utility closer to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) where there is a set of
priors R over the full state space implied by all histories of events,












The key to establishing this reformulation is to note that all sets of one-step-ahead con-
ditionals, as one varies over times and histories, determines a unique set of priors R over
the full state space satisfying the regularity conditions deﬁned in Epstein and Schneider
(2003). The latter also establishes formally that if one deﬁnes multiple-priors utility ac-
cording to (2), an added restriction on R is needed to ensure dynamic consistency. To
avoid this complication, we will adopt the Epstein and Wang model in (1) and specify
the sets of one-step-ahead conditionals as a primitive, instead of the set of priors over
the full state space.
2.2 Example
To understand our model and results, an illustrative example proves useful. Consider an
investor who contemplates to invest irreversibly in a project in a three period setting.
Assume that the investor is risk neutral and his subjective discount factor is β = 0.2.
The payoﬀ in period 0 is certain, while the payoﬀs in periods 1 and 2 are uncertain.
5Investment costs I = 145. The initial value of the project is x = 100. In periods 1 and
2, the value of the project may go up or down by 50% (see Figure 1). These events are
independent.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
In standard models, the investor views the investment as purely risky. We may
suppose that up and down have equal probability. Then according to the Marshallian
net present value principle, the investor will not invest at period zero since the net present
value of the investment opportunity is
NPV = x + β (1.5x + 0.5x)/2 + β
2 (2.25x/4 + 0.75x/2 + 0.25x/4) − I = −21 < 0.
However, if the investor can postpone the investment, he can observe whether the value
of the project goes up or not. He can avoid the downside loss by investing when the value
goes up. We use backward induction to solve the problem. It is clear that the value of
the investment at period 2, F2, is positive only when the project value is 2.25x,
F2 (2.25x) = max{2.25x − I,0} = 80.
Next, one can show that the value of the investment at period 1, F1, is positive only for
the project value 1.5x,
F1 (1.5x) = max{1.5x − I,0.5βF2 (2.25x)} = 8 > 1.5x − I.
Finally, the value of the investment in period 0 is
F0 (x) = max{x − I,0.5βF1 (1.5x)} = 0.8 > 0 > x − I.
Thus, the investor will wait to invest at period 2 if and only if the value of the project
goes up in both periods 1 and 2. This example illustrates the key idea of the real options
approach that waiting has positive value.
Now, consider the situation under which the investor is ambiguous about the project
value. Suppose he thinks that the value of the project goes up with probability 1/2 or
1/4. He is risk neutral and his preferences are represented by (1). We still use backward
6induction. Again, in period 2, the investment has positive value only for the project
value 2.25x,
V2 (2.25x) = max{2.25x − I,0} = 80.
In period 1, the investor compares the value of immediate investment with that if waiting
until period 2. However, the investor values period 2 investment by taking the worst
scenario. It can be shown that the value of the investment is positive only when the
project value is 1.5x,











Finally, by a similar calculation, the period zero value of the investment is







= 0.25 > x − I.
The above two inequalities state that an uncertainty averse investor chooses optimally
to invest in period 1, when the project value goes up. Moreover, he has a lower option
value than the investor with expected utility since V0 (x) < F0 (x).
In summary, this example shows that waiting has positive value for both uncertainty
averse agent and the expected utility maximizer. However, the option value of the in-
vestment opportunity is lower under Knightian uncertainty than in the standard model.
Therefore, an uncertainty averse agent invests earlier. We next turn to the formal model.
2.3 A Baseline Setup
Consider an inﬁnite horizon discrete time optimal stopping problem. As explained in
Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the optimal stopping problem can be applied to study an
agent’s option exercise decision. The agent’s choice is binary. In each period, he decides
on whether stopping a process and taking a termination payoﬀ, or continuing for one
more period, and making the same decision in the future.
Formally, uncertainty is generated by a Markov state process (xt)t≥0 taking values in
X = [a,b] ⊂ R. The probability kernel of (xt)t≥0 is given by P : X → M(X), where
M(X) is the space of probability measures on X endowed with the weak convergence
topology. Continuation at date t generates a payoﬀ π (xt), while stopping at date t
7yields a payoﬀ Ω(xt), where π and Ω are functions that map X into R. The decision is
irreversible in that if the agent chooses to stop, he will not make further choices. Suppose
the agent is risk neutral and discount future payoﬀ ﬂows by β ∈ (0,1).
It is important to point out that, in the preceding setup, if the agent decides to stop,
uncertainty is fully resolved. He has ambiguity from waiting only. In Section 2.5, we
will consider a more general case where there is uncertainty about the termination payoﬀ
and the agent is ambiguous about this payoﬀ. We will show that depending on relative
degrees of ambiguity about diﬀerent sources of uncertainty, ambiguity may have diﬀerent
impact on the agent’s option exercise decision.
In standard models, the agent’s preferences are represented by time-additive expected
utility. As in the rational expectations paradigm, P can be interpreted as the objective
probability law governing the state process (xt)t≥0, and is known to the agent. The expec-
tation in the utility function is taken with respect to this law. Alternatively, according to
the Savage utility representation theorem, P is a subjective (one-step-ahead) prior and
represents the agent’s beliefs. By either approach, the standard stopping problem can be
described by the following Bellman equation:
F (x) = max
￿







where the value function F can be interpreted as an option value.
To ﬁx ideas, we make the following assumptions. These assumptions are standard in
dynamic programming theory (see Stokey and Lucas (1989)).
Assumption 1 π : X → R is bounded, continuous, and increasing.
Assumption 2 Ω : X → R is bounded, continuous and increasing.
Assumption 3 P is increasing and satisﬁes the Feller property. That is,
R
f (x′)P (dx′;x)
is increasing in x for any increasing function f and is continuous in x for any bounded
and continuous function f.
The following proposition describes the solution to problem (3).
8Proposition 1 Let Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then there exists a unique bounded, continu-
ous and increasing function F solving the dynamic programming problem (3). Moreover,
if there is a unique threshold value x∗ ∈ X such that




′;x) > (<)Ω(x), for x < x
∗, and




′;x) < (>)Ω(x), for x > x
∗,
then the agent continues (stops) when x < x∗ and stops (continues) when x > x∗. Finally,









This proposition is illustrated in Figure 2. The threshold value x∗ partitions the set
X into two regions – continuation and stopping regions.6 The top diagram of Figure 2
illustrates the situation where




′;x) > Ω(x), for x < x
∗,
and




′;x) < Ω(x), for x > x
∗.
In this case, we say that the continuation payoﬀ curve crosses the termination payoﬀ curve
from above. Under this condition, the agent exercises the option when the process (xt)t≥0
ﬁrst reaches the point x∗ from below. The continuation region is given by {x ∈ X : x <
x∗} and the stopping region is given by {x ∈ X : x > x∗}. This case describes the upside
of the agent’s decision such as investment. The downside aspect such as disinvestment
or exit is illustrated in the bottom diagram of Figure 2. The interpretation is similar.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
In the above model, a role for Knightian uncertainty is excluded a priori, either
because the agent has precise information about the probability law as in the rational
6For ease of presentation, we do not give primitive assumptions about the structure of these re-
gions. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 129) for such an assumption. For the applications below, our
assumptions can be easily veriﬁed.
9expectations approach, or because the Savage axioms imply that the agent is indiﬀerent to
it. To incorporate Knightian uncertainty and uncertainty aversion, we follow the multiple-
priors utility approach (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Epstein and Wang (1994)) and
assume that beliefs are too vague to be represented by a single probability measure and
represented instead by a set of probability measures. More formally, we model beliefs
by a probability kernel correspondence P : X ⇉ M(X). Given any x ∈ X, we think
of P (x) as the set of conditional probability measures representing beliefs about next
period’s state. The multivalued nature of P reﬂects uncertainty aversion of preferences.
The stopping problem under Knightian uncertainty can be described by the following
Bellman equation:
V (x) = max
￿

















for any Borel function f : X → R. Note that if P = {P}, then the model reduces to the
standard model (3).
To analyze problem (5), the following assumption is adopted.
Assumption 4 The probability kernel correspondence P : X ⇉ M(X) is nonempty
valued, continuous, compact-valued, and convex-valued, and P (x) ∈ P (x) for any x ∈
X. Moreover, given any Q(·;x) ∈ P (x),
R
f (x′)Q(dx′;x) is increasing in x for any
increasing function f : X → R.
This assumption is a generalization of Assumption 3 to correspondence. It ensures
that
R
f (x′)P (dx′;x) is bounded, continuous, and increasing in x for any bounded,
continuous, and increasing function f : X → R. Notice that this assumption is quite
general in the sense that it captures the fact that ambiguity may vary with the state.
However, in some examples in Section 3, we consider an IID case in order to derive closed
form solutions.
102.4 Erosion of Option Value
We now analyze the implications of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion on the option
exercise decision for the preceding baseline model. We ﬁrst characterize the solution to
problem (5) in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Let Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then there is a unique bounded, continuous,
and increasing function V solving the dynamic programming problem (5). Moreover, if
there exists a unique threshold value x∗∗ ∈ X such that




′;x) > (<)Ω(x), for x > x
∗∗, and




′;x) < (>)Ω(x), for x < x
∗∗,
then the agent stops (continues) when x < x∗∗ and continues (stops) when x > x∗∗.









This proposition implies that the agent’s option exercise decision under Knightian
uncertainty has similar features to that in the standard model described in Proposition
1. It is interesting to compare the option value and option exercise time in these two
models.
Proposition 3 Let assumptions in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 hold. Then V ≤ F.
Moreover, for both V and F, if the continuation payoﬀ curves cross the termination payoﬀ
curves from above then x∗∗ ≤ x∗. On the other hand, if the continuation payoﬀ curves
cross the termination payoﬀ curves from below, then x∗∗ ≥ x∗.
In the standard model, an expected utility maximizer views the world as purely risky.
For the decision problems such as investment, waiting has value because the agent can
avoid the downside risk, while realizing the upside potential. Similarly, for the decision
problems such as exit, waiting has value because the agent hopes there is some chance
that the future may be brighter. Now, if the agent has imprecise knowledge about the
likelihoods of the state of the world and hence perceives the future as ambiguous, then
11waiting will have less value for an uncertainty averse agent because he acts on the worst
scenario.
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
The threshold value under Knightian uncertainty can be either bigger or smaller than
that in the standard model, depending on the shapes of the continuation and termination
payoﬀ curves (see Figure 3). More speciﬁcally, if the continuation payoﬀ curve crosses
the termination payoﬀ curve from above, then the threshold value under Knightian un-
certainty is smaller than that in the standard model. The opposite conclusion can be
obtained if the continuation payoﬀ curve crosses the termination payoﬀ curve from below.
For both cases, an uncertainty averse agent exercises the option earlier than an agent
with expected utility because the former has less option value.
The following proposition concerns comparative statics.
Proposition 4 Let the assumptions in Proposition 2 hold. Consider two probability
kernel correspondences P1 and P2. Let the corresponding value functions be V P1 and
V P2 and the corresponding threshold values be xP1 and xP2. If P1 (x) ⊂ P2 (x), then
V P1 ≥ V P2. Moreover, if the continuation payoﬀ curves cross the termination payoﬀ
curves from above (below), then xP1 ≥ (≤)xP2.
It is intuitive that the set of priors captures ambiguity aversion and the degree of
ambiguity aversion. A larger set of priors means that the agent has more imprecise
knowledge and is less conﬁdent to assign probabilities to states of the world. Hence, he is
more ambiguity averse. This proposition says that the option value is lower if the agent
is more ambiguity averse, and hence a more ambiguity averse agent exercises the option
earlier (see Figure 4). Our interpretation of this proposition is based on the deﬁnition
of absolute and comparative ambiguity aversion proposed by Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2002).7 Their theory may also provide a behavioral foundation of the interpretation
that the set of priors describes the degree of ambiguity. A similar interpretation is also
given in Nishimura and Ozaki (2004). Henceforth, if one increases the set of priors in the
7See Epstein (1999) and Epstein and Zhang (2001) for a diﬀerent deﬁnition.
12sense of set inclusion, we may interpret that ambiguity is increased or the agent is more
ambiguity averse.
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
2.5 Ambiguity about Termination Payoﬀs
So far, we have assumed that once the agent exercises the option, uncertainty is fully
resolved, and that the agent bears ambiguity from waiting only. As will be illustrated
in the applications in Section 3, in reality there are many instances in which there is
uncertainty about termination payoﬀs. We now show that if the agent is ambiguous
about termination payoﬀs, ambiguity may have diﬀerent impact on the agent’s option
exercise decision.
To illustrate, we ﬁrst consider a simple case where the termination payoﬀ Ω(xt) does
not depend on the state xt. However, it is a random variable with distribution Q. In
addition to ambiguity about the state process (xt)t≥0 , the agent is also ambiguous about
the termination payoﬀ Ω. He has a set of priors Q over Ω. In this case, the agent is
ambiguous about two diﬀerent sources of uncertainty. Section 3.3 will show that an
instance of this case is the exit problem. We now formally replace Assumption 2 with
Assumption 5 Ω is a random variable with distribution Q and Q is weakly compact
and contains Q.
The agent’s decision problem can be described by the following Bellman equation:












When Q ={Q} and P = {P}, the preceding problem reduces to the standard one for an
expected utility maximizer.
One can prove a characterization proposition for (7) similar to Proposition 2. In
particular, there is a threshold value such that the agent exercises the option the ﬁrst
time the process (xt)t≥0 falls below this value. However, there is no clear-cut result about
comparative statics and the comparison with the standard model as in Propositions 3-4.
This is because ambiguity lowers both the continuation payoﬀ and the termination payoﬀ.
13The overall impact on the option exercise decision depends on which eﬀect dominates.
If we ﬁx ambiguity about the continuation payoﬀ and consider the impact of ambiguity
about the termination payoﬀ only, we have the following clean comparative statics result
analogous to Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 Let Assumptions 1 and 3-5 hold and ﬁx P. Consider two sets of priors
Q1 and Q2. Let the corresponding value functions be V Q1 and V Q2 and the corresponding
threshold values be xQ1 and xQ2. If Q1 ⊂ Q2, then V Q1 ≥ V Q2 and xQ1 ≥ xQ2.
This proposition shows that although ambiguity about termination payoﬀs lowers
the option value from continuation, the agent exercises the option later if he is more
ambiguous about the termination payoﬀs. This is because ambiguity also lowers the
termination payoﬀ and this eﬀect dominates.
In the previous case, there is no future uncertainty about termination payoﬀs. In
reality, there are many instances in which there is ongoing uncertainty about termination
payoﬀs after the agent exercises the option. For example, an agent decides whether and
when to invest in a project which can generate a stream of future uncertain proﬁts.
Then the termination payoﬀ Ω(x) depends on the future uncertainty about the proﬁts
generated by the project. To incorporate this case, we assume that Ω(x) satisﬁes the
following Bellman equation





where the period payoﬀ Φ : X → R is an increasing and continuous function. Note
that by the Blackwell Theorem, there is a unique bounded and continuous function Ω
satisfying (8). In the standard model with expected utility, we have












￿ ￿ ￿ ￿x0 = x
#
.
When Ω(x) is given by (8), the agent’s decision problem is still described by the
dynamic programming equation (4). Again, we can show that ambiguity lowers the
14option value V (x). However, since ambiguity about the state process (xt)t≥0 lowers both
the option value and the termination payoﬀ, there is no general comparative statics result
about the option exercise timing. We will illustrate this point in the next section.
3 Applications
This section applies our results to two classes of problems: real investment and ﬁrm
exit. The real investment decision is an example where an agent decides whether or
not to exercise an option to pursue upside potential. Entry and job search are similar
problems. The exit problem represents an example where an agent decides whether or
not to exercise an option to avoid downside potential. Other examples include default
and liquidation decisions.
3.1 Investment
A classic application of the option exercise problem is the irreversible investment de-
cision.8 The standard real-options approach makes the analogy of investment to the
exercising of an American call option on the underlying project. Formally, consider an
investment opportunity which can generate stochastic values given by a Markov process
(xt)t≥0 . Investment costs I > 0. Then we can cast the investment problem into our
framework by setting
Ω(x) = x − I, π (x) = 0.
We can also write the agent’s investment decision problem as follows









Note that, according to this setup, once the investor makes the investment, he obtains
net rewards x − I and uncertainty is fully resolved. In reality, it is often the case that
investment rewards come from the uncertain future. For example, after the investor
invests in a project or develops a new product, the project can generate a stream of future
uncertain proﬁts. The investor may be ambiguous about proﬁt ﬂows. To incorporate this
8See Bernanke (1983), Brennan and Schwartz (1985), and McDonald and Siegel (1986) for important
early contributions. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a textbook treatment.
15case, we presume that the period t proﬁt is given by xt. Then the discounted total project
value at date t is given by





and the investor’s decision problem is formulated as









The standard real-options model predicts that there is an option value of waiting,
because investment is irreversible and ﬂexibility in timing has value. Another main
prediction of the standard real investment model is that an increase in risk in the sense
of mean-preserving spread raises the option value and delays investment (see Pindyck
and Dixit (1994)). This derives from the fundamental insight behind the option pricing
theory, in that ﬁrms may capture the upside gains and minimizes the downside loss by
waiting for the risk of project value to be partially resolved.
[Insert Figure 5 Here]
While the standard real-options model predicts a monotonic relationship between
investment and risk, our model makes an important distinction between risk and uncer-
tainty. We argue that risk (which can be described by a single probability measure) and
uncertainty (multiplicity of priors) have diﬀerent eﬀects on investment timing. Speciﬁ-
cally, our model predicts that Knightian uncertainty lowers option value of waiting (see
Figure 5). Moreover, under formulation (9), Propositions 3-4 imply that an increase in
ambiguity pulls the investment trigger earlier and hence speeds up investment. These
propositions also imply that the more ambiguity averse the investor is, the earlier he
makes the investment.
As pointed in Section 2.5, this conclusion is not generally true if there is ongoing
uncertainty about the termination payoﬀ. For the investment problem under the formu-
lation in (10)-(11), the investor may be ambiguous about the future proﬁt opportunities
of the investment project. He may well hesitate to invest.
We now consider a concrete parametric example to illustrate the above analysis. Re-
call X = [a,b]. Following Epstein and Wang (1994), we consider an IID ε−contamination
16speciﬁcation of the set of one-step-ahead priors. That is, let
P (x) = {(1 − ε)µ + εm : m ∈ M(X)} for all x, (12)
where ε ∈ [0,1] and µ is any distribution over X. The interpretation is the following:
µ represents the “true” distribution of the reward. The investor does not know this
distribution precisely. With probability ε, he believes that the reward may be distributed
according to some other distribution. Here ε may represent the degree of ambiguity and
ambiguity aversion. This can be justiﬁed by observing that, if ε is larger, the set P (x) is
larger in the sense of set inclusion. When ε = 0, P (x) = {µ} and the model reduces to the
standard one with expected utility. When ε = 1, the investor is completely ignorant about
the “true” distribution. The following proposition characterizes the optimal investment
trigger.
Proposition 6 Assume (12). (i) For problem (9), the investment threshold x∗ satisﬁes
the equation9
x
∗ − I =













µ [x] + εa) − I =






Moreover, x∗ increases in ε.
The interpretation of (13) is the following. The left-hand side of (13) represents the
net beneﬁt from investment. The right-hand side represents the opportunity cost of
waiting. Because waiting has positive option value, the investment threshold exceeds the
investment cost I. Equation (13) states that at the investment threshold, the investor is
indiﬀerent between investing and waiting. It is also clear from (13) that because ambigu-
ity lowers the option value, the right-hand side of (13) is less than that in the standard
model with ε = 0. Moreover, an increase in ε lowers the investment threshold. Thus, an
9We have implicitly assumed that there are parameter values such that there exists an interior so-
lution. We will not state such an assumption explicitly both in this proposition and in Proposition
7.
17increase in ambiguity speeds up investment and a more ambiguity averse investor invests
relatively earlier.
The interpretation of (14) is similar. The diﬀerence is that there is future uncertainty
about proﬁt opportunities of the investment project. Under the ε−contamination speci-
ﬁcation in (12), using (10) one can verify that the value of the investment project is given
by




µ [x] + εa).
When ε is increased, ambiguity lowers both the project value represented by the left-hand
side of (14) and the option value from waiting represented by the right-hand side of (14).
Proposition 6 demonstrates that the former eﬀect dominates so that the investor delays
the investment.
It is interesting to note that when ε approaches 1, the investor has no idea about the
true distribution of the proﬁt. Ambiguity erodes away completely the option value from
waiting. Speciﬁcally, for problem (9) in which there is no ambiguity about termination
payoﬀ, the investment threshold becomes x∗ = I. For problem (11) in which there
is ambiguity about both termination and continuation payoﬀs, the investment threshold
satisﬁes x∗+
β
1−β a = I. Note that for both problems, the investor adopts the myopic NPV
investment rule. Further, if the investor is also ambiguous about the future proﬁts from
the project after investment, the investor computes the NPV of the project according
to the worst case scenario, in which he believes that the cash ﬂow in each period in the
future takes the minimum value a.
3.2 Exit
Firm exit is an important problem in industrial organization and macroeconomics.10 We
may describe a stylized exit model as follows. Consider a ﬁrm in an industry. The process
(xt)t≥0 could be interpreted as a demand shock or a productivity shock. Stay in business
at date t generates proﬁts Π(xt) and incurs a ﬁxed cost cf > 0. The ﬁrm may also exit
and seek outside opportunities. Let the outside opportunity value be a constant γ ≥ 0.
10See Hopenhayn (1992) for an industry equilibrium model of entry and exit.
18Then the problem ﬁts into our framework by setting
Ω(x) = γ, π (x) = Π(x) − cf,
where we assume Π(·) is increasing and continuous.
According to the standard real options approach, the exit trigger is lower than that
predicted by the textbook Marshallian net present value principle. This implies that
ﬁrms stay in business for a long period of time while absorbing operating losses. Only
when the upside potential gain is bad enough, will the ﬁrm not absorb losses and abandon
operation. The standard real options approach also predicts that an increase in risk in
the sense of mean preserving spread raises the option value, and hence lowers the exit
trigger. This implies that ﬁrms should stay in business longer in riskier situations, even
though they suﬀer substantial losses. However, this prediction seems to be inconsistent
with the large amount of quick exit in IT industry in recent years.
The Knightian uncertainty theory may shed light on this issue. In recent years, due
to economic recessions, ﬁrms are more ambiguous about the industry demand and their
productivity. They are less sure about the likelihoods of when the economy will recover.
Intuitively, the set of probability measures that ﬁrms may conceive is larger in recessions.
Thus, by Proposition 4, the option value of the ﬁrm is lower and the exit trigger is higher.
This induces ﬁrms to exit earlier (see Figure 6).
[Insert Figure 6 Here]
The previous argument relies crucially on the fact that the outside value γ is a con-
stant. In reality, there may be uncertainty about the outside value. For example, the
outside value could represent the scrapping value of the ﬁrm and the ﬁrm is uncertain
about its market value. The outside value could also represent the proﬁt opportunity of
a new business and the ﬁrm is uncertain about this opportunity. Proposition 5 shows
that, ceteris paribus, if the ﬁrm is more ambiguous about the outside value, it will be
more hesitant to exit. Thus, the overall eﬀect of ambiguity on the exit timing depends
on the relative degrees of ambiguity about diﬀerent sources.
To illustrate, we consider a parametric example. We simply take Π(x) = x ∈ X =
[a,b]. We still adopt the IID ε−contamination speciﬁcation (12) for the process (xt)t≥0 .
19When the outside value γ is a constant, the ﬁrm’s decision problem is described the
following Bellman equation
V (x) = max
￿








When the ﬁrm is also ambiguous about the outside value, we adopt the following η−











,η ∈ [0,1], (16)




and may represent the “true” distribution of γ.
The interpretation is that the ﬁrm is not sure about the true distribution of the outside
value and believes other distributions are possible with probability η. Note that η can
be interpreted as a parameter measuring the degree of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion
about the outside value. In this case, the ﬁrm’s decision problem is described by the
following Bellman equation:














The following proposition characterizes the solutions to problems (15) and (17).
Proposition 7 Assume (12) and (16). (i) For problem (15), the exit threshold x∗ sat-
isﬁes the equation
(1 − β)γ = x










ν [γ] + ηγ
￿
= x





Moreover, x∗ increases in ε and decreases in η.
The interpretation of (18) is the following. The left-hand side of (18) represents the
per period outside value if the ﬁrm chooses to exit. The right-hand side represents the
20payoﬀ if the ﬁrm chooses to stay. In particular, the ﬁrst term represents the immediate
proﬁts and the second term represents the option value of waiting. At the exit threshold
value, the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between exit and stay. From (18), the impact of ambiguity
is transparent. An increase in ε lowers the option value of stay in business by raising the
exit threshold. Hence, the ﬁrm exits earlier.
The interpretation of (19) is similar. Note that, as one ﬁxes ε and increases η, the
outside value and the exit trigger are reduced. Thus, ceteris paribus, ambiguity about
the outside value delays exit. If the ﬁrm is more ambiguous about the outside value, it
exits later. If one increases both ε and η, either eﬀect may dominate and the overall
eﬀect on the exit timing depends on the relative degrees of ambiguity about these two
sources of uncertainty.
Note that as in the investment problem, when ε is equal to 1, the option value of
waiting to exit is equal to zero. Thus, the ﬁrm just follows the simple myopic NPV rule,
by using the worst-scenario belief.
4 Conclusion
There are many economic decisions that can be described as an option exercise problem.
In these decision making settings, uncertainty plays an important role. In standard
expected utility models, there is no meaningful distinction between risk and uncertainty
in the sense attributed to Knight (1921). To aﬀord this distinction, we apply the multiple-
priors utility model to analyze an option exercise problem. In particular, we formulate
it as a general optimal stopping problem. While the standard analysis shows that risk
increases option value, we show that ambiguity lowers the option value. Moreover, the
impact of ambiguity on the option exercise timing depends crucially on whether the agent
has ambiguity about termination payoﬀs after option exercise. If uncertainty is fully
resolved after option exercise, then an increase in ambiguity speeds up option exercise
and a more ambiguity averse agent exercises the option earlier. However, if the agent is
ambiguous about the termination payoﬀ, then the agent may delay option exercise if this
ambiguity dominates ambiguity about continuation.
We apply our general model to ﬁrm investment and exit problems. For the investment
21problem, we show that if the project value is modeled as a stock value and uncertainty
over this value is fully resolved after investment, then ambiguity accelerates investment.
However, if the project value is modeled as a discounted sum of future uncertain proﬁt
ﬂows and the agent is ambiguous about these proﬁts, then ambiguity may delay invest-
ment. For the exit problem, we presume that there are two sources of uncertainty –
outside value and proﬁt opportunities if stay in business. The ﬁrm may be ambiguous
about both sources. We show that ambiguity may delay or accelerate exit depending
on the eﬀect of ambiguity about which source dominates. We also show that for both
problems, the myopic NPV rule often recommended by the business textbooks and invest-




Proof of Proposition 1: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2. So we omit it.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let C (X) denote the space of all bounded and continuous
functions endowed with the sup norm. C (X) is a Banach space. Deﬁne an operator T
as follows:
Tv (x) = max
￿






, v ∈ C (X).
Then it can be veriﬁed that T maps C (X) into itself. Moreover, T satisﬁes the Blackwell
suﬃcient condition and hence is a contraction mapping. By the Contraction Mapping
Theorem, T has a unique ﬁxed point V ∈ C (X) which solves the problem (5) (see
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 in Stokey and Lucas (1989)).
Next, let C′ (X) ⊂ C (X) be the set of bounded continuous and increasing functions.
One can show that T maps any increasing function C′ (X) into an increasing function
in C′ (X). Since C′ (X) is a closed subset of C (X), by Corollary 1 in Stokey and Lucas
(1989, p.52), the ﬁxed point of T, V, is also increasing. The remaining part of the
proposition is trivial and follows from similar intuition illustrated in Figure 2. Q.E.D.
Remark: The Contraction Mapping Theorem also implies that limn→∞ T nv = V for
any function v ∈ C (X).
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23It follows from induction that the ﬁxed point of T,V, must also satisfy V ≤ F. The
remaining part of the proposition follows from this fact and Figure 3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Deﬁne the operator T P1 : C (X) → C (X) by
T
P1v (x) = max
￿






, v ∈ C (X).
Similarly, deﬁne an operator T P2 : C (X) → C (X) corresponding to P2. Take any
functions v1,v2 ∈ C (X) such that v1 ≥ v2, it can be shown that T P1v1 (x) ≥ T P2v2 (x).
By induction, the ﬁxed points V P1 and V P2 must satisfy V P1 ≥ V P2. The remaining part
of the proposition follows from Figure 4. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: First, one can use the standard dynamic programming tech-
nique similar to that used in Propositions 2-4 to show that the value functions V Q1
and V Q2 are increasing and V Q1 ≥ V Q2. To show xQ1 ≥ xQ2, let Gi (x) = V (x) −
minq∈Qi
R
Ωdq for i = 1,2. Then from (7), we can derive that
G
i (x) = max
￿











Again, by the standard dynamic programming technique, we can show that Gi is increas-
ing and G2 (x) ≥ G1 (x). The threshold values xQ1 are determined by the equation













Ωdq and G2 (x) ≥ G1 (x), we have xQ1 ≥ xQ2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: Because V (x) is an increasing and continuous function, the
optimal investment rule is described as a trigger policy whereby the investor invests the
ﬁrst time the process (xt)t≥0 hits a threshold value x∗. We now determine x∗ and focus




x − I if x ≥ x∗,
β
R b
a V (x′)P (dx′;x) if x < x∗.
(A.1)
24At the threshold value x∗, we have
x






According to the IID ε−contamination speciﬁcation (12), we have
x
∗ − I = β (1 − ε)
Z b
a





Since the minimum of V (x) is β
R b
a V (x′)P (dx′;x), which is equal to x∗ − I by (A.2),
we can rewrite the preceding equation as
x
∗ − I = β (1 − ε)
Z b
a
V (x)dµ + βε(x
∗ − I)





















Note that in the last equality, we have used (A.1) and (A.2). Rearranging yields the
desired result (13).
The comparative statics result follows from the implicit function theorem applied to
(13). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 6. We consider
part (i) ﬁrst. The value function V (x) satisﬁes
V (x) =
￿
x − cf + β
R b
a V (x′)P (dx′;x) if x ≥ x∗,
γ if x < x∗.
(A.3)
At the threshold value x∗, we have
γ = x






Given the IID ε−contamination speciﬁcation (12), we can derive
γ = x
∗ − cf + β (1 − ε)
Z b
a





25Since the minimum of V (x) is γ by (A.3), we can rewrite the preceding equation as
γ = x
∗ − cf + β (1 − ε)
Z b
a
V (x)dµ + βεγ
= x




















Here the last equality follows from (A.3) and (A.4). Simplifying yields (18). The com-
parative static result follows from simple algebra.





γdq = (1 − η)E
ν [γ] + ηγ.
Equation (19) follows from a similar argument for (18). The comparative statics result
follows from simple algebra. Q.E.D.
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Figure 2: Value functions and exercising thresholds in the standard model. The top
diagram illustrates an option exercise problem such as investment. The bottom diagram
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Figure 3: Comparison of the standard model and the model under Knightian uncertainty.
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Figure 4: Option value and exercising thresholds under Knightian uncertainty for two
diﬀerent sets of priors P1 ⊂ P2.
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Figure 5: Investment timing under Knightian uncertainty and in the standard model. The
upper (dashed) curve corresponds to the value function F(x) in the standard model. The





Figure 6: Firm Exit under diﬀerent degrees of Knightian uncertainty. The upper (dashed)
curve corresponds to the value function V P1(x) and the lower (solid) curve corresponds
to the value function V P2(x) where P1 ⊂ P2.
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